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During March 2006–March 2009, a total of 6,355 sus-
pected cases of avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) were reported to 
the Ministry of Health in Egypt. Sixty-three (1%) patients 
had conﬁ  rmed infections; 24 (38%) died. Risk factors for 
death included female sex, age >15 years, and receiving 
the ﬁ  rst dose of oseltamivir >2 days after illness onset. All 
but 2 case-patients reported exposure to domestic poultry 
probably infected with avian inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1). No cas-
es of human-to-human transmission were found. Greatest 
risks for infection and death were reported among women 
>15 years of age, who accounted for 38% of infections and 
83% of deaths. The lower case-fatality rate in Egypt could 
be caused by a less virulent virus clade. However, the lower 
mortality rate seems to be caused by the large number of 
infected children who were identiﬁ  ed early, received prompt 
treatment, and had less severe clinical disease.
D
uring January 2003–March 2009, a total of 417 hu-
man cases of avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) and 256 deaths 
(61%) were reported worldwide (1). Although human-to-
human transmission has occurred (2–4), most human cases 
have been caused by zoonotic transmission from poultry 
(5–8). Investigations have emphasized the need for timely 
identiﬁ  cation to determine demographic groups at risk and 
activities more likely to cause human infection so that con-
trol and prevention measures may be implemented. Such 
investigations may also determine whether the virus can 
cause pandemic disease.
Avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) in Egypt was ﬁ  rst reported in 
February 2006 when outbreaks were observed in domes-
tic poultry at commercial farms and in backyard ﬂ  ocks in 
3 governorates in northern Egypt. Within the ﬁ  rst month, 
avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) was detected in 12 other governor-
ates. Despite control measures that included culling, dis-
infection, vaccination, and controlled poultry movement, 
epizootic transmission of avian inﬂ   uenza virus (H5N1) 
continues.
During February 2006–March 2009, avian inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H5N1) was detected on 907 commercial poultry 
farms and in 606 backyard ﬂ  ocks. In 2006, poultry farms 
accounted for 84% of 1,052 outbreaks. In 2007, backyard 
ﬂ  ocks accounted for 89% of 274 outbreaks. As of March 
2009, nineteen of 29 governorates reported infected poul-
try. The poultry industry in Egypt produces ≈2 million birds 
per day. Social and economic consequences have been dra-
matic (losses of ≈2–3 billion US$). Backyard ﬂ  ocks are 
common; 4–5 million families (≈25 million persons) raise 
poultry at home. During February 2006–March 2009, a to-
tal of 3,941 asymptomatic persons exposed to avian inﬂ  u-
enza (H5N1) from a person with a conﬁ  rmed case or from 
infected poultry were tested by using a real-time PCR; none 
were positive.
In March 2006, the ﬁ  rst human case of avian inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) in Egypt was reported from Qalubiya Governorate 
(Figure 1). We report the ﬁ  rst 63 human cases. We also 
describe affected demographic groups, illness, mortality 
rates, and speciﬁ  c events that contributed to transmission.
Materials and Methods
The study protocol (NAMRU3.2004.0023) was re-
viewed and approved by the Naval Medical Research Unit 
No. 3 Institutional Review Board in compliance with all 
applicable federal regulations governing protection of hu-
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man subjects. Suspected cases of avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) in 
humans are reported from all districts in Egypt. A suspect-
ed case-patient is a person with inﬂ  uenza-like illness (fever 
>38°C and 1 of the following signs or symptoms [cough, 
sore throat, or shortness of breath]) and speciﬁ  c exposure 
to ill, dying, or dead poultry. All suspected case-patients 
are referred to speciﬁ  ed fever or chest hospitals for testing 
and medical care. At these hospitals, oropharyngeal swab 
specimens and serum samples are obtained. Persons with 
suspected cases receive an initial dose of oseltamivir and 
are placed in respiratory isolation areas.
Swab specimens are sent to the Ministry of Health 
(MOH) Central Public Health Laboratory for real-time 
PCR testing for inﬂ  uenza A virus matrix and H5 genes by 
using primer–probe sets (9). Positive samples are sent to 
the US Naval Medical Research Unit 3, a World Health 
Organization H5 Reference Laboratory, for conﬁ  rmation 
and virus isolation.
Most case-patients with conﬁ   rmed avian inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) are transferred to Cairo, Egypt, for care at 2 ter-
tiary hospitals. Data are obtained by healthcare providers 
who initially evaluate suspected cases and by MOH staff 
when cases are conﬁ  rmed. Epidemiologic and clinical data 
are obtained for each patient with a conﬁ  rmed case by us-
ing a standardized case investigation form. For this study, a 
medical record review was performed at tertiary care hos-
pitals. Clinical and exposure data were not available for all 
63 patients.
The number of patients for whom data were available 
is noted. Children are deﬁ  ned as persons <15 years of age, 
adults as persons >15 years of age, delayed hospitalization 
as >2 days between illness onset and hospitalization, and 
delayed oseltamivir as >2 days between illness onset and 
the ﬁ  rst oseltamivir dose. 
Univariate analyses were performed by using Epi Info 
version 3.4.1 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Atlanta, GA, USA). Unless otherwise noted, χ2 or Fisher 
exact tests were used. Multivariate analysis to identify risk 
factors for death was performed by using a backward, step-
wise logistic regression model starting with all variables 
(dichotomized at their median value) signiﬁ  cant by univar-
iate analyses. The Wald statistic and log-likelihood ratio 
were used to exclude variables. Multivariate analyses were 




During March 2006–March 2009, a total of 6,355 sus-
pected cases of avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) were reported, and 
samples were tested by the Central Public Health Labora-
tory. Of these, 63 (1%) cases were conﬁ  rmed and 24 were 
fatal (case-fatality rate 38%) (Table 1). Among 63 case-
patients, median age was 10 years (range 16 months–75 
years), 24 (38%) were women >15 years of age, 5 (8%) 
were men >15 years of age, 16 (25%) were girls <15 years 
of age, and 18 (29%) were boys <15 years of age (Table 1). 
Two infected women were pregnant; both died of respira-
tory failure. Clinical or exposure data were not available 
for 2 case-patients (a 31-year-old man infected in Egypt 
who became ill and whose inﬂ   uenza was diagnosed in 
Jordan, and a 75-year-old woman who died within hours 
of hospitalization). Risk factor data on exposure to birds 
were available for 41 case-patients (Table 1). Conﬁ  rmed 
cases were reported from 19 of 29 governorates in Egypt 
(Figure 1). During 2006, most case-patients were located 
in the Nile Delta region. In contrast, during 2007–2009, 
cases were distributed in northern and southern Egypt. 
Of 63 case-patients, 29 (46%) had illness onset in March 
(Figure 2).
Three family clusters were identiﬁ  ed. The ﬁ  rst cluster, 
reported in March 2006, was composed of 2 siblings (21 
months and 6 years of age) in Kafr El Sheikh Governorate. 
The second cluster, reported in December 2006, was com-
posed of 3 family members (a mother, her daughter, and the 
daughter’s uncle) in Gharbia Governorate. The third clus-
ter, reported in March 2007, was composed of 2 siblings 
(4 and 6 years of age) in Qena Governorate. In the ﬁ  rst 2 
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Figure 1. Residences of 63 case-patients with avian inﬂ  uenza virus 
(H5N1) infections, Egypt, 2006–2009. 1, Alexandria; 2, Kafr El 
Sheikh; 3, Gharbia; 4, Menoﬁ  a; 5, Qalubiya; 6, Behera; 7, Damietta; 
8, Dakahlia; 9, Sharkia; 10, Cairo; 11, 6th of October; 12, Suez; 
13, Fayoum; 14, Benu Suef; 15, Menia; 16, Assyut; 17, Sohag; 18, 
Qena; 19, Aswan.Zoonotic Transmission of Avian Inﬂ  uenza Virus
clusters, all shared a common exposure to likely infected 
poultry and became ill at the same time. In the third cluster, 
although illness onsets were separated by 4 days, an inves-
tigation showed that each child had 2 separate exposures to 
infected birds. Human-to-human infections were not iden-
tiﬁ  ed. Household contacts were not given oseltamivir but 
were followed up closely for 10 days. Secondary infections 
were not found.
Clinical Manifestations
Median number of days between illness onset and hos-
pitalization was 2 (range 0–12 days). Female patients and 
adults were ill longer before hospitalization than were male 
patients and children. Of 40 female patients, 23 (57.5%) had 
delayed hospitalization (>2 days after illness onset) com-
pared with 7 (32%) of 22 males. Of 28 patients >15 years of 
age, 20 (71%) had delayed hospitalization compared with 
10 (29%) of 34 patients <15 years of age (p = 0.002). Fever 
(97%) and cough (72%) were the most common clinical 
signs. Sore throat was reported by 45% of case-patients and 
shortness of breath by 25% (Table 2). Adults were more 
likely to have cough (81%), muscle and joint aches (46%), 
and shortness of breath (38%); sore throats were more com-
mon in children (50%) (Table 2).
Clinical Course of Disease
Forty-six (73%) of 63 case-patients were transferred 
to Cairo for deﬁ  nitive care. Of 17 case-patients not trans-
ferred to Cairo, 5 (29%) died <2 days after being admitted 
to a governorate hospital. Of 59 case-patients for whom 
data on complications were available, >1 secondary com-
plication developed in 25 (42%). Sixteen case-patients 
had multiple complications (Table 3). The most common 
complications were acute respiratory distress syndrome 
(19 cases), shock (14 cases), renal failure (6 cases), and 
coagulopathy (4 cases). Mortality rate was higher for pa-
tients with a complication (n = 25); twenty (80%) died. 
Only 1 (3%) of 34 patients without complications died 
(p<0.01).
Of 19 case-patients with acute respiratory distress 
syndrome, 18 died. The only survivor was an 18-year-old 
woman who received intubation for 12 days and oseltamivir 
2 days after illness onset. A complication was more likely 
to develop in adults; 20 (77%) of 26 had >1 complication 
compared with only 5 (15%) of 33 children (p<0.001).
Chest radiographs were reviewed for 58 patients. 
Twenty-ﬁ  ve (43%) radiographs showed lobar inﬁ  ltrates, 
of which 20 (80%) were bilateral. Of 33 radiographs for 
children, 27 (82%) showed no abnormalities. Abnormal 
laboratory test results included those for leukopenia (16/52, 
31%), thrombocytopenia (13/49, 27%), and elevated lev-
els of aspartate aminotransferase (23/46, 50%) and alanine 
aminotransferase (20/48, 42%).
Medication records were available for 60 patients who 
received antimicrobial drugs. Of 60 patients, 31 (52%) 
received oxygen, including 22 (37%) who received me-
chanical ventilation. Twenty (74%) of 27 adults received 
mechanical ventilation compared with only 2 (6%) of 33 
children (p<0.001). Of 60 patients, 16 (27%) had received 
corticosteroids. Mortality rates did not differ between intu-
bated patients who received corticosteroids and those who 
did not.
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Table 1. Demographic and exposure characteristics for persons with confirmed avian influenza (H5N1), Egypt, 2006–2009 
Characteristic No. (%) persons 
Total confirmed cases  63
Deaths 24 (38.0) 
Women 40 (63.5) 
Age group, y  
 0–4  23 (36.5) 
 5–14  11 (17.5) 
 15–49  27 (43.0) 
 > 50 2 (3.0) 
Exposure (no. persons)* 
  Exposure to a person with a confirmed case before illness (63)  4 (6.3) 
 Occupational  (63)  4 (6.3) 
  Exposure to likely infected backyard flocks (63)  57 (90.5) 
  No known exposure (63)  2 (3.2) 
  Consumption of raw or undercooked poultry products (61)  0
Exposure to likely infected backyard flocks (41) 
Recently purchased domestic poultry from market/seller (41)  12 (29.2) 
Recently purchased poultry became ill (12)  7 (58.3) 
Noted illness or death among their birds (41)  33 (80.5) 
Bred birds (27)  14 (51.8) 
Slaughtered birds in past 10 d (27)  13 (48.1) 
Defeathered birds in past 10 d (27)  13 (48.1) 
*Denominators vary for each exposure because data were not available for all persons. RESEARCH
Oseltamivir Treatment, Virus Isolates, 
and Oseltamivir Resistance
All 62 case-patients who became ill in Egypt received 
>1 dose of oseltamivir. Of 58 patients for whom complete 
data for oseltamivir was available, 25 (43%) received their 
ﬁ  rst dose <48 hours after illness onset; all but 1 survived. 
Median duration of treatment was 8 days (range 1–37 
days). The ﬁ  rst dose of oseltamivir was more likely to be 
delayed for adults. Twenty (80%) of 25 adults had a delay 
before receiving oseltamivir compared with 13 (39%) of 33 
children (p = 0.005).
Virus isolates were obtained from 34 (54%) of 63 
case-patients. Sequencing of hemagglutinin and neuramin-
idase genes showed all viruses belonged to clade 2.2 and 
were closely related to isolates from birds in Europe and 
the Middle East (10). Drug sensitivity was determined for 
all isolates. Resistance to oseltamivir was conﬁ  rmed in vi-
ruses from 2 patients in the same family; both died. Resis-
tance was observed in the initial diagnostic sample and did 
not occur during treatment. A mutation at position N294S 
conferring a 12–15× reduction in drug susceptibility was 
identiﬁ  ed in both isolates (11).
Mortality Rates
Of 63 case-patients with conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza, 24 (38%) 
died. Median time between onset of illness and death was 
9 days (range 4–40 days). Ten (56%) of 18 ill patients died 
in 2006 compared with 9 (36%) of 25 ill patients in 2007 
and 4 (50%) of 8 ill patients in 2008 (Figure 2). Mortality 
rates were higher for adults and female patients for whom 
hospitalization or oseltamivir administration were delayed 
(Table 4). Of 24 deaths, 22 (92%) were among adults and 
21 (87.5%) were among female patients. Twenty-one 
(52.5%) of 40 female patients died compared with 3 (13%) 
of 23 male patients (p = 0.005). Two (6%) of 34 children 
died compared with 22 (76%) of 29 adults (p<0.001). Of 
30 persons who were ill >48 hours before hospitalization, 
20 (67%) died compared with only 4 (12.5%) of 32 per-
sons hospitalized <48 hours after illness onset (p<0.001). 
Of 33 patients whose ﬁ  rst oseltamivir dose was delayed, 
19 (58%) died compared with only 1 (4%) of 25 patients 
who received oseltamivir <48 hours after illness onset 
(p<0.001).
Although adults were more likely than children to 
have a delay in hospitalization, age >15 years and delayed 
hospitalization were independently associated with higher 
mortality rates. Of 28 adults for whom hospitalization data 
were available, 12 (43%) were hospitalized in the ﬁ  rst 48 
hours of illness compared with 27 (79%) of 34 children 
(p = 0.007). Stratiﬁ  ed analysis showed delayed hospitaliza-
tion was a greater risk factor for death among adults than 
among children. Eighteen (86%) of 20 adults hospitalized 
>48 hours after illness onset died compared with 4 (50%) 
of 8 adults hospitalized <48 hours after illness onset (p = 
0.04). None of 24 children hospitalized <48 hours after 
illness onset died compared with 2 (20%) of 10 children 
hospitalized >48 hours after illness onset. Nineteen (83%) 
of 23 female patients hospitalized >48 hours after illness 
onset died compared with 2 (12%) of 17 hospitalized <48 
hours after illness onset (p<0.001).
Eighteen (90%) of 20 adults whose ﬁ  rst oseltamivir 
dose was delayed died compared with 1 (20%) of 5 adults 
whose ﬁ  rst oseltamivir dose was not delayed (p = 0.005). 
None of 20 children who received oseltamivir <48 hours 
of illness onset died compared with 1 (8%) of 13 children 
whose ﬁ  rst dose was delayed.
Age, sex, delayed hospitalization, and delayed use of 
oseltamivir were included in multivariate analysis by us-
ing a logistic model to identify risk factors for death. Sex 
and delayed hospitalization did not contribute to the ﬁ  nal 
model. Because of relatively few cases, high degree of co-
variance in age, and delayed use of oseltamivir, there was 
insufﬁ  cient power to further develop this model. Despite 
this limitation, analysis showed that age >15 years and 
having received a ﬁ  rst dose of oseltamivir >2 days after 
illness onset were likely independent risk factors contrib-
uting to death.
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Figure 2. Illness onset for 63 case-patients with conﬁ  rmed avian 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1), by month, Egypt, 2006–2009.
Table 2. Signs and symptoms at illness onset for 60 persons with 
confirmed avian influenza (H5N1), by age group, Egypt, 2006–
2009*
Sign or symptom 
Age group, y, no. (%)
p value
<15,
n = 34 
t15,
n = 26 
Fever  34 (100)  24 (92)  >0.05
Cough  22 (65)  21 (81)  >0.05
Shortness of breath  5 (15)  10 (38)  <0.05
Sore throat  17 (50)  10 (38)  >0.05
Vomiting 3 (9)  7 (27)  >0.05
Diarrhea  2 (6)  4 (15)  >0.05
Muscle/joint pain  2 (6)  12 (46)  <0.001 
Headache  1 (3)  6 (23)  <0.05
Alteration of consciousness  1 (3)  1 (4)  >0.05
*Data regarding signs and symptoms were available only for 60 of the 63 
patients. Zoonotic Transmission of Avian Inﬂ  uenza Virus
Exposure
Handling live domestic poultry likely infected with 
avian inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) was the primary source of 
exposure. Investigations showed that human-to-human 
transmission was unlikely; even clusters of case-patients 
had exposure to infected poultry. Of 63 case-patients, 4 
(6%) were involved in poultry production or distribution 
(3 poultry farm workers and 1 seller), 2 (3%) had unknown 
poultry exposure, and 57 had direct contact with backyard 
poultry (Table 1).
Exposure data were available for 41 of 57 case-patients 
with exposure to backyard ﬂ  ocks. Of these case-patients, 
33 (80%) reported having had ill birds in their egg-laying 
ﬂ  ocks and 12 (29%) had recently bought poultry. Of these 
12 case-patients, 7 (58%) reported that purchased birds be-
came ill after being brought home. Of 27 case-patients for 
whom information was documented, 13 (48%) slaughtered 
or defeathered birds (Table 1). No case-patients reported 
eating raw or undercooked animal products.
Discussion
In February 2006, avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) emerged 
among domestic poultry in the Nile Delta of Egypt. Within 
4–5 weeks, it had affected commercial farms and backyard 
ﬂ  ocks throughout Egypt and resulted in zoonotic transmis-
sion to 10 persons in many governorates. Currently, Egypt 
has reported the third largest number of cases of avian in-
ﬂ  uenza (H5N1) after Indonesia and Vietnam (1).
The mortality rate for avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) in Egypt 
(38%) is lower than that in other countries. As of March 
2009, mortality rates were 82% in Indonesia, 50% in Viet-
nam, 66% in the People’s Republic of China, and 68% in 
Thailand. Explanations for this observation include lower 
mortality rates for certain demographic groups, clinician 
awareness resulting in improved medical care, or less patho-
genic virus. The most striking ﬁ  nding is the low mortality 
rate for children. Although children represent 54% of report-
ed infections, they account for only 8% of deaths. This high 
survival rate is unlikely to be caused by young age alone. 
Children were hospitalized earlier in the clinical course of 
their illness, were more likely to receive oseltamivir within 
the ﬁ  rst 2 days, and appeared to be less ill than adults, as 
noted by the high proportion of chest radiographs with no 
abnormal ﬁ  ndings and the low proportion of children with 
respiratory failure. Differences in sensitivity of surveillance 
methods among countries must also be considered.
One must also consider whether the 2.2 virus clade is 
less virulent. This suggestion is not supported by a report 
of the 2005–2006 outbreak of clade 2.2 virus (H5N1) in 
Turkey, where of 8 patients 5–15 years of age, 4 (50%) 
died (6).
Despite overall low mortality rates, particularly among 
children, the mortality rate in women was >52%. This rate 
could be due to reasons that include receiving a higher 
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Table 3. Secondary complications in persons infected with avian influenza virus (H5N1), Egypt, 2006–2009* 
No. secondary 
complications No. persons Type of complications (no. persons), outcome
Case-fatality rate by 
no. complications (%) 
1 6 ARDS (n = 2), 2 died; bacteremia (n = 2), 2 alive; pneumonia (n = 1), 1 
alive; shock (n = 1), 1 alive
2/6 (33)
2 11 ARDS/pneumonia (n = 3), 2 died, 1 alive; ARDS/shock (n = 5), 1 died; 
ARDS/ renal failure (n = 1), 1 died; ARDS/coagulopathy (n = 1), 1 died; 
pneumonia/toxic myocarditis (n = 1), 1 alive
9/11 (82)
3 5 ARDS/pneumonia/shock (n = 3), 3 died; ARDS/shock/renal failure (n = 1), 1 
died; shock/renal failure/coagulopathy (n = 1), 1 died
5/5 (100)
4 2 ARDS/pneumonia/shock/renal failure (n = 1), 1 died; ARDS/shock/renal 
failure/coagulopathy. (n = 1), 1 died
2/2 (100)
5 1 ARDS/pneumonia/shock/ renal failure/coagulopathy (n = 1), 1 died 1/1 (100)
*ARDS, acute respiratory distress syndrome. 
Table 4. CFRs for 63 persons infected with avian influenza virus 
(H5N1), Egypt, 2006–2009* 
Characteristic Total no.  No. died  CFR, % 
Sex† 
 F  40 21 52.5
 M  23 3 13
Age group, y‡ 
 0–4  23 0 0
 5–14  11 2 18
 15–49  27 20 74
 >50 2 2 100
 All  ages  63 24 38
Days between illness onset and hospitalization§ 
 0–2  32 4 12.5
 3–4  12 4 33
 5–6  9 8 89
 >79 8 8 9
Days between illness onset and first oseltamivir dose¶ 
 0–2  25 1 4
 3–4  14 3 21
 5–6  7 5 71
 >71 2 1 1 9 2
*CFR, case-fatality rate. 
†p = 0.0004, by Ȥ
2 test for CFR for female patients vs. that for male 
patients. 
‡p<0.001, by Ȥ
2 test for patients <15 years of age vs. patients >15 years of 
age.
§p<0.001, by Ȥ
2 test for patients hospitalized <2 d after illness onset vs. 
patients hospitalized after 2 d. 
¶p<0.001, by Ȥ
2 test for patients who received oseltamivir <2 d after illness 
onset vs. patients who received oseltamivir after 2 d. RESEARCH
virus inoculum to the lungs through activities associated 
with slaughtering and defeathering birds, a more profound 
proinﬂ  ammatory cytokine response, or delay in receiving 
healthcare. Only delay in receiving healthcare was exam-
ined in this study. Women reported a longer time between 
illness onset and hospitalization and a longer time until the 
ﬁ  rst dose of oseltamivir than men. Women and men who 
sought healthcare were admitted to the same facilities and 
received identical care.
More than 5,000 asymptomatic persons known to have 
been exposed to poultry infected with avian inﬂ  uenza virus 
(H5N1) or in contact with conﬁ  rmed human case-patients 
were followed up clinically and tested by using real-time 
PCR. Although prophylaxis was not given, inﬂ  uenza-like 
illnesses were not observed and all persons showed nega-
tive results. Although serologic testing is needed to exclude 
infection with avian inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1), it was unlikely 
that a large proportion of these persons with high-level ex-
posures to infected birds or humans became infected and 
supports the decision of the MOH to discontinue testing 
asymptomatic persons. This ﬁ  nding is consistent with those 
of studies in Thailand (12) and Cambodia (13).
Although infection and illness do not develop in most 
persons exposed to infected poultry, all but 2 cases were at-
tributed directly to exposure to poultry likely infected with 
avian inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1). No illnesses were attributed 
to exposure to wild birds. Although 3 family clusters were 
identiﬁ  ed, all 7 persons in these clusters had independent 
exposures. Many families in Egypt raise backyard ﬂ  ocks 
for eggs and purchase live poultry for meat. Among case-
patients, the likely route of infection appears to be direct 
handling, slaughtering, or defeathering infected birds re-
cently purchased for meat and mingling of recently pur-
chased birds with egg-laying ﬂ  ocks. Recently purchased 
birds were frequently slaughtered before illness was not-
ed, and purchase was often followed by illness and death 
among egg-producing ﬂ  ocks.
Contact between backyard ﬂ  ocks and wild infected 
birds could not be estimated, but exposure to feral poul-
try in canals and waterways near affected households was 
common. Because persons in Egypt rely on live poultry 
purchased at markets for dietary protein, the price of 
poultry inﬂ  uences poultry-buying practices of families. 
Women in several affected families noted exceptionally 
low prices for healthy looking birds. These prices indi-
cated that they might be buying infected birds. This ﬁ  nd-
ing was true when prices of beef increased in response to 
decreased availability or increased demand. Despite this 
knowledge, most persons believed they would be able to 
slaughter and prepare birds before they became ill or died. 
This belief was true in most cases but recently purchased 
birds frequently infected egg-laying ﬂ  ocks, which died 
within days of exposure.
Despite knowledge of overall exposure patterns and 
identiﬁ  cation of groups at risk for exposure, little detailed 
information on activities that result in infection is available. 
Although slaughtering and defeathering infected birds ap-
pear to be high-risk practices, there have likely been thou-
sands of infected birds sold and slaughtered in homes in 
Egypt over the past 3 years. Despite this suggestion, we 
have reports of only 63 cases. Although exposure to avian 
inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) infection is necessary for infection, 
exposure is not sufﬁ  cient to explain the epidemiology of 
cases of avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) in Egypt. Whether there is 
another unknown risk factor or variation in the way women 
slaughter poultry in Egypt is unclear.
Demographics of inﬂ  uenza cases in Egypt are differ-
ent from those in other highly affected countries and are 
useful for determining exposures and activities that result 
in infection. Women appear to be at greater risk than men 
of becoming infected, and, once ill, at greater risk of death. 
In Egypt, the male:female ratio among patients is 1:1.7 and 
differs markedly from the 1:1 ratio seen globally (14,15). 
Caring for or slaughtering poultry is generally the respon-
sibility of women and may explain a higher exposure rate 
for women. Similarly, age distribution of case-patients dif-
fers. In Egypt, 54% of case-patients were <15 years of age, 
compared with <35% in Indonesia, Vietnam, and China. In 
Egypt, small children follow their mothers during routine 
chores, such as feeding and slaughtering poultry. At other 
times, children will play with poultry, which roam freely 
around the home. There is a general belief that parents in 
Egypt will quickly seek medical care for their ill children. 
This belief is strongly suggested by the fact that children 
with fever and exposure to dead or ill poultry were con-
sistently evaluated and hospitalized sooner than adults. In 
addition, many children had mild illness. Mild clinical ill-
ness may be caused by early hospitalization, early doses of 
oseltamivir, or a low virus inoculum.
This report describes 63 human cases of avian inﬂ  u-
enza (H5N1) in Egypt during March 2006–March 2009. 
During April–July 2009, a total of 20 additional cases were 
identiﬁ  ed (83 cases by the end of July 2009) for which data 
were not available. Analysis of limited information re-
ported to the World Health Organization showed a median 
age of 4 years (compared with 10 years for the 63 cases), a 
case-fatality rate of 15% (compared with 38%), and faster 
hospitalization after illness onset. Ongoing transmission in 
the summer of 2009 is indicative of persistent disease in 
poultry, and limited analysis reﬂ  ects the high proportion of 
inﬂ  uenza in children. Thus, avian inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) 
remains endemic throughout Egypt. However, human infec-
tions are rare and disproportionately affect women and their 
children, who are responsible for caring for and slaughter-
ing birds within the home. To reduce their risk, speciﬁ  c 
slaughtering practices and other transmission risk factors 
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should be identiﬁ  ed and appropriate interventions imple-
mented. In addition, emphasis on controlling domestic 
poultry populations and increased use of bird cages, hand 
washing, and other protective measures speciﬁ  c for women 
and children should continue.
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